On 23 July 2026, the Secretariat of the Competition Commission (COMCO) published for consultation a draft guidance note on agreements affecting competition in labour markets (available in German, French, and Italian). Although the document is still a draft, it already clearly shows how the authority intends to apply the Cartel Act to labour markets going forward. Undertakings, associations and HR professionals thus receive written guidance for the first time and should take the opportunity to review their compliance and to participate in the consultation.

Background
At the end of 2022, the COMCO Secretariat opened a preliminary investigation into the labour market in the banking sector, which was subsequently extended to further industries. In its final report "Wage Agreements" of 27 June 2024, the COMCO Secretariat found that more than 200 undertakings from various industries had, over a period of years, regularly exchanged detailed information on salaries, salary developments, fringe benefits and other employment conditions. Despite indications of unlawful agreements affecting competition, the COMCO Secretariat refrained from opening a formal investigation and instead announced that it would develop, in dialogue with the social partners, the authorities and interested parties, best practices for conduct in labour markets that complies with cartel law. The draft guidance note now published implements this announcement.

Key statements of the draft
The Cartel Act applies to labour markets without any general exemption. It applies to all undertakings active on labour markets (including public authorities and self-employed persons acting as market participants) and to industry and employers' associations, but not to dependent employees. Undertakings must take decisions on recruitment, remuneration and HR policy independently. The focus is on three categories of cases: wage-fixing agreements on salaries, salary components and fringe benefits with monetary value; non-solicitation and no-hire agreements (no-poach); and the exchange of competitively sensitive information on employment conditions. Collective bargaining within the framework of the social partnership and intra-group arrangements do not fall within the scope of the Cartel Act. Ancillary restraints to concentrations of undertakings and joint ventures remain permissible to the extent that they are directly related to the main transaction, necessary and proportionate.

Selected points for practice

• Wage-fixing: Agreements or concerted practices between undertakings on salaries or other remuneration components constitute agreements affecting competition. They fix purchase prices for the production factor labour and can be compared to price-fixing agreements under Art. 5 para. 3 let. a CartA. The entire remuneration is covered: in addition to the base salary, this includes fixed and variable salary components as well as fringe benefits, which are considered material price components. The assessment depends on the design of the agreement and on its actual or potential effects in the individual case.
• Non-solicitation and no-hire agreements (no-poach): Agreements not to hire certain employees of other undertakings, not to actively solicit them, or to employ them only under certain conditions can be compared to agreements on the restriction of quantities or the allocation of markets under Art. 5 para. 3 let. b and let. c CartA. This covers not only direct agreements but also industry-wide arrangements and recommendations issued by industry or employers' associations. Such agreements restrict employee mobility and weaken employees' bargaining position. Non-solicitation and no-hire agreements as ancillary restraints to concentrations of undertakings and joint ventures remain permissible to the extent that they are directly related to the main transaction, necessary and proportionate.
• Exchange of sensitive information: Exchanges of information may give rise to risks under cartel law where competitors exchange information capable of allowing conclusions to be drawn about their current or future market conduct. Information regarded as competitively sensitive includes, in particular, individual salaries, internal salary bands, current or planned salary increases, bonus schemes and remuneration structures, as well as recruitment, hiring and workforce-reduction plans. The COMCO Secretariat's rule of thumb is as follows: the more current, detailed and individualised the information, the higher the risk under cartel law. Aggregated, anonymised and sufficiently historical data are generally less problematic.
• Benchmarking: Salary and HR benchmarking remains possible if risk-mitigating elements are observed cumulatively: participation of at least five undertakings, aggregated data, anonymisation of the results, historical data, administration by an independent third party, and exclusion of current or future individual data. No single element is sufficient on its own; the circumstances of the individual case remain decisive.
• Collective bargaining between the social partners: Negotiations on collective employment agreements (CEAs) and other collective negotiations between employers and employee organisations are exempt from the Cartel Act. The draft, however, draws clear boundaries here: exchanges of information among employers in the run-up to CEA negotiations must not go beyond the content to be regulated in the CEA. Arrangements outside the channels of collective employment law, for example without involvement of the social partner, enjoy no protection.
• Apprentices' salaries: Dual vocational education and training is recognised as a joint task of business, the state and society; the authorities intend to take into account its specific features and the functioning of the system as a whole. Training companies nevertheless remain undertakings within the meaning of the Cartel Act and also compete in the markets for apprentices. Agreements and concerted practices that go beyond fulfilling the economy-wide training mandate and restrict competition for apprentices therefore remain potentially critical under cartel law. Against this background, the COMCO Secretariat considers the recommendations on apprentices' salaries customary in most cantons for numerous occupational sectors to be justified under cartel law, to the extent and for as long as they serve a functioning vocational education and training system. A case-by-case assessment taking into account the specific features of the vocational education and training system nevertheless remains decisive.
• Restraint on the part of the authorities: In the concluding remarks, the competition authorities announce that they will, as a rule, exercise restraint in labour markets and will always choose the mildest possible means. They will, however, intervene against conduct that is, by international consensus, clearly harmful to competition.

Next steps
The consultation runs until 30 September 2026. The consolidated, final version of the guidance note is expected by the end of 2026.

Recommended actions
Already today, it is advisable to: (1) review HR processes, memberships in associations, HR networks and peer exchange groups as well as salary surveys from a cartel law perspective; (2) align existing exchange formats with the criteria of the draft or discontinue them; (3) review non-solicitation and remuneration clauses in service, cooperation and transaction agreements; (4) train HR professionals and executives; (5) use the consultation to address open points, for example on direct sanctionability or benchmarking thresholds. In cases of uncertainty, advice from the COMCO Secretariat (Art. 23 para. 2 CartA) and the opposition procedure (Art. 49a para. 3 let. a CartA) are available; for legacy conduct, the leniency programme (self-reporting) may be considered.